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Erosion of Solidarity in France and  
Welfare Conventions: The New Role of 
Complementary Health Insurance 
Philippe Batifoulier, Jean-Paul Domin & Amandine Rauly  
Abstract: »Erosion der Solidarität in Frankreich und Wohlfahrtskonventionen: 
Die neue Rolle der Zusatzkrankenversicherung«. The French health system 
has been structurally in crisis since the early 1980s. This crisis is reflected in 
the loss of legitimacy of the conventional Fordist vision of national solidari-
ty, which is characterized by a “crisis of legitimacy.” The Fordist convention 
has the particularity of corresponding to a harmonious representation of 
social justice between the different orders (economic, political, and domes-
tic) of social protection. Contemporary criticism of the health care system 
uses what was once the basis of institutionalized compromise between or-
ders. The result is a new role for supplementary health insurance. This new 
role overturns the concept of solidarity that characterizes health policies. A 
new conventional vision is emerging: the liberal convention. This analysis 
focuses on the French case where complementary insurance has historically 
fulfilled solidarity missions. The new status of supplementary protection is 
accompanied by an unequal drift, which cannot be seen as the expression of 
a natural antagonism between economic efficiency and social justice. In 
France, expenditure has remained high while inequalities have increased. 
These limits have led the legislator to modify its policy by exempting certain 
patients from contributing to the financing of their own health expenditure. 
These sensitive adjustments are costly when the initial objective is to reduce 
expenditure and tend to generate new inequalities. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the French health system has faced a double crisis. The first 
is a financing crisis. This is linked to its deficit focusing on budget shrinkage 
and the question of the social security “hole.” This is an image constantly 
referred to in the French media pertaining to the social security deficit 
(Monneraud 2009). The second is a crisis of its legitimacy. It is the result of a 
questioning of the definition of national solidarity. This article proposes to 
shed light on the reasons for this structural crisis by focusing on the second 
element: the erosion of national solidarity. There is no universal definition 
of national solidarity; there are, however, several interpretations of solidari-
ty. These analytical grids can be described as conventions. There are differ-
ent conventional visions of national solidarity. The structural crisis of the 
French health system can then be interpreted as the difficulty of bringing 
out a new dominant and legitimate vision of national solidarity. 
According to the approach of economics of convention (in short EC), we 
assume that there is no one vision of national solidarity and that there are 
also fewer representations than individuals. There is a small number of 
shared references that can be called conventions (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 
2005; Diaz-Bone and Favereau 2019; Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011) and these 
conventions are collective representations of the collective organization of 
the solidarity. A convention’s dominant position is not a matter of legitimacy 
but of the balance of power. A convention does not prevail because it is 
supposedly more legitimate but because of the state the conflict has 
reached. Several orders of “worth” (grandeur in French) does not preclude 
domination. 
In France, the health system was built during a particular period, that of 
Fordism. This period was marked by a compromise on the distribution of 
wealth that made it possible to support capitalism. The construction of so-
cial protection and the health system made it possible to legitimize capital-
ism, thereby making it possible to qualify the social and collective represen-
tation of social protection, as it was built in 1946, as a Fordist convention. 
The principles of national solidarity are enshrined in the preamble to the 
French Constitution of 1946 (taken over by the French Constitution of 1958), 
which guarantees rights at work, health protection, access to education, and 
material security. The Fordist convention of national solidarity is based on 
the principles of distributive social justice. It is financed by income tax and 
is based on a redistribution of resources. Each citizen contributes according 
to his means. The principle of national solidarity, recognized as a creator of 
social cohesion, is at the origin of the creation of several health and social 
protection institutions, at the head of which is the social security created in 
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1945. Social protection is mainly based on a state-organized obligatory in-
surance system. 
The end of the Fordist logic of accumulation also marks the loss of legiti-
macy of the Fordist convention of national solidarity. The values of another 
conventionalist vision penetrate political debates and question the organiza-
tion of solidarity. These debates led to a new balance of power concerning 
the weight of each institution in the health system since the mid-1970s. The 
crisis of legitimacy of the Fordist vision will allow a particular group of or-
ganizations to get away with it: the complementary health insurance organi-
zations. These organizations play a leading role in the transformation of the 
health system’s organization and the underlying logic of solidarity. The co-
financing of the national solidarity as a complementary health insurance 
company is associated with the historical role played by the concept of mu-
tuality when creating and developing the French social protection system. 
Historically, the mutual insurance companies based on corporations ful-
filled their mission as insurance companies by socializing the risks and 
relinquishing any private insurance company’s logic. 
Nowadays, the French market of complementary insurance is most une-
ven. Those with the highest incomes benefit from the largest insurance 
covers (Saliba-Serre and Ventelou 2009) and the least sick are the best cov-
ered. Any transfer towards complementary health insurances is hence 
largely inequitable. If France is generally considered as the archetype or 
one of the archetypes of the interdependent health system, this judgment 
must be mitigated by the recent evolutions. A charge transfer from the pub-
lic health insurance system to the complementary health insurance compa-
nies changes the rules of the game. These evolutions characterize not the 
erosion of national solidarity in general, but the conventional Fordist vision 
and its associated principles. The development of complementary health 
insurance organizations is part of another normative framework, which 
corresponds to another conventional vision. This time, it is a liberal conven-
tional vision, based on targeting, privatization, and segmentation. 
We propose to characterize these two conventional visions of national sol-
idarity and the role of complementary health insurance organizations in the 
transition from one to the other. 
The aim of this paper is to show how these two conventions have been ex-
pressed over time and come into competition in thinking about national 
solidarity. The story is about a progressive shift from a Fordist convention to 
a liberal convention. This text is part of the Welfare Conventions Approach 
studying welfare state and the “governmentality” of welfare as disputes, i.e., 
as dynamic processes of creating new “welfare apparatuses” (Rose and Mil-
ler 1992). Welfare is a matter of disputes that can be traced to welfare con-
ventions. Welfare conventions are a means to framing social problems (in 
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this paper, health issues), identifying dedicated causes and solutions that 
empower certain actors such as complementary health insurance. 
We shall organize our argumentation in two steps. We show in a first part 
that the French health system was built during the Fordist period. The Ford-
ist Convention on Social Protection is based on a compromise between the 
different orders (economic, political, and domestic) of social protection. The 
social justice and the socialization of expenditure are at the core of this 
convention. Since the end of the Fordist period, the elements justifying the 
organization of social protection have become the main focus of criticism of 
this same organization. Complementary health insurances are presented as 
the institutions that will allow framing the excesses of the social protection 
system. The legitimacy of the Fordist convention is called into question and 
a new liberal conventionalist vision is expressed (section 1). The second part 
highlights how the growing transfer of a portion of expenses towards com-
plementary health insurance causes new forms of inequalities, now super-
imposed on pre-existing social inequalities. This unfair drift cannot be con-
sidered as the expression of a natural antagonism between economic 
efficiency and social justice. In France, expenses remain quite high (11% of 
the GDP) when inequalities are worsening. These limits have led the legisla-
tor to amend his policy by exonerating certain patients from contributing to 
the financing of their own health expenses. These noticeable adjustments 
are costly whereas the initial objective is to reduce expenses and tend to 
generate new inequalities (section 2). 
2. No Future for National Solidarity in the New Spirit of 
Capitalism 
Following the recent work of Batifoulier, Da Silva, and Duchesne (2019) on 
French social security, we show that it is possible to associate convention 
and ideology. We note here that conventions are, on the one hand, sources 
of general justifications that legitimize representations of common goods 
and, on the other hand, sources of individual justifications that refer to 
individual values and beliefs (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). National soli-
darity can be interpreted differently depending on the normative represen-
tation of the world.1 We show that during the Fordist period, a compromise 
existed between the different orders (political, economic, and domestic) and 
that the modalities of justification for the representations of national soli-
darity were not antagonistic. There is no conflict within the framework of 
the conventional Fordist vision. However, the absence of conflict between 
 
1  In this sense, we retain the definition given by Joan Robinson (1962). 
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orders can be seen as an anomaly in terms of conventionalist analysis.2 The 
end of the Fordist period brings with it the rise of disagreements between 
the orders of social protection and therefore the need to justify the repre-
sentation of national solidarity (section 2.1). 
The preservation of the organizational form of social protection then de-
pends on how the national solidarity is legitimized. Since the 1970s, there 
has been disagreement about the legitimacy of Fordist principles. The pub-
lic health insurance crisis that began in the 1980s called these principles into 
question. The rise of neo-liberal ideas led to an erosion of the Fordist repre-
sentation of national solidarity, which shifted the compromise to another 
legitimate representation of this common good. A new conventional liberal 
representation is emerging; the result is a new liberal convention. Nowa-
days, the socialization of insurance is perceived as a perverse incentive. The 
development of a private relief system, meant to raise the individual’s sense 
of responsibility, has then become a way of undermining free rider-type 
behaviors. This conception of the sick person as a potential cheater has led 
the public authorities to use the levers of individual rationality for constrain-
ing individuals and enticed them to adopt thrifty behaviors. Desocialization 
of individuals then becomes one of the means implemented to raise their 
sense of responsibility. When the patient’s trickery is revealed, private relief 
becomes legitimate (section 2.2). 
2.1 From the Construction to the Questioning of the Fordist 
Convention 
In France, social protection covers “all institutional mechanisms, public or 
private, taking the form of a collective welfare system and/or implementing 
a principle of social solidarity, which cover the charges resulting for indi-
viduals or households from the existence of a certain number of identified 
social risks (health, elderly, unemployment, poverty...)”3 (Elbaum 2011, 6). 
This is the definition used for the construction of the social protection ac-
counts. However, this is not a definition that is fixed in time. This definition 
refers to a particular interpretative framework: that of the Fordist period. 
This interpretation can be considered as a convention since it provides a 
common framework that allows coordination (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011; 
Batifoulier 2001). In line with the approach of EC, we consider that conven-
tions are not only specific rules (Favereau 1995; 1998) but are also a social 
 
2  The notion of convention exists precisely because there are conflicts of representation and 
disagreements. It is the ordinary conflicts that make it possible to justify a particular represen-
tation of the common good (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). In our case, the common good 
deals with national solidarity.  
3  Author's translation. 
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and collective representation in which value judgements and normative 
considerations are taken into account. By highlighting the diversity of rep-
resentations (Diaz-Bone and Favereau 2019; Latsis, Larquier, and Bessis 
2010), the approach of EC makes it possible to understand that national 
solidarity is based on different conventional visions. These conventions 
define a particular form of organization of the health system and the institu-
tions that play a leading role in it. 
The protection against social risks, and more particularly against health 
risks, is traditionally at the center of the justification of capitalism during 
the Fordist period. In order to be legitimate, capitalism must constantly 
justify the meaning of capital accumulation. Accumulation itself makes no 
sense. The justification for this accumulation is not to be found in the pur-
pose of capitalism but in the exercise of solidarity that it is supposed to 
make possible. During the Fordist era from 1945 to the mid-1970s, national 
solidarity became a higher common good. As a result, two principles were 
stabilized and legitimized: the principle of accumulation of resources 
(founder of capitalism) and the principle of distributive social justice. These 
principles are at the origin of the Fordist convention of national solidarity. 
Fordist welfare convention is associated with full employment:  
States intervene by means of macroeconomic oversight and anticyclical 
investment programs to prevent economic crises. Social security can be 
organized through protectionism, subsidizing industries, and strengthen-
ing workers’ rights. Infrastructure in- vestments, purchasing programs, 
and protective labor law are the main instruments [...] this model favors 
expenditure to create good quality jobs rather than welfare services for 
those excluded. (Chiapello and Knoll 2019, 17) 
Capitalism creates inequalities of income but makes it possible to finance a 
model of social protection based on obligatory social security contributions 
and introduces a principle of distributive social justice. The justification for 
accumulation is based on a compromise around the use of the gains of the 
economic growth. The social protection and the capitalism exert a commu-
tative power that leads to reciprocal legitimacy. Capitalism is acceptable 
because the associated economic growth improves the living conditions of 
citizens. In the Fordist convention, the regime of accumulation refers to a 
form of social capitalism. What is described as a compromise in the Fordist 
convention is the ability to reconcile referents from different orders.4 
 
4  This is not a compromise as it is read in the regulationist literature in the sense that the re-
quirements of justification remain fully necessary. In this convention, the institutions can be 
seen as arrangements between the different orders that are stabilized for a period of time, but 
this stability is not fixed in time. This compromise in the case of social protection is estab-
lished between three orders: political, economic, and domestic (Barbier and Théret 2009; 
Théret 2010). 
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This compromise is based on criteria that are not those usually mentioned 
when justifying a conventionalist vision. In the case of the Fordist period, it 
does not refer to altruistic characteristics of individuals or to criteria consid-
ered as such in the hierarchy of individual preferences, but rather, if we 
take up the Rawlsian vocabulary (Rawls 1971; Eymard-Duvernay 2001), to 
the fact that individuals are placed under a “veil of ignorance” concerning 
the economic and social position they will have in the near future and which 
influences their decisions (Goujon 1997). The beginning of the Fordist peri-
od coincided with the end of the Second World War. This period is charac-
terized both by strong economic growth but also by uncertainty about geo-
political stability. National political stability is also a source of uncertainty. 
Concerning domestic order, some people came out of the war richer, but 
many others lost everything. Building a social cohesion is the first principle 
of the national solidarity to avoid new conflicts, both national and interna-
tional. Individuals concede that the construction of the social protection can 
only be achieved by extending the prerogatives of the state to assure a min-
imum security for everyone. Concerning the economic order, the develop-
ment of social protection ensures a healthy workforce. The development of 
the role of the state also makes it possible to cope with increasing globaliza-
tion (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). The firms accept social contributions 
and in return the government supports them in the necessary adaptation of 
their productive organization to cope with technological change and global-
ization. This first dimension of the Fordist convention of national solidarity 
is legitimate in the sense that it is justified by an objective of common good 
(Diaz-Bone 2016). What is particular about the Fordist convention is the fact 
that this representation of the common good cuts across the three orders of 
social protection (political, economic, and domestic). 
The second founding principle of Fordist convention is social justice. It is 
possible to qualify the national solidarity as a higher common good during 
the Fordist period. However, this requires a clarification of the compromis-
es that this involves in the definition of social justice. The initial compro-
mise is established around a distributive dimension. A plurality of defini-
tions of “just” exist (Ricœur 2001), representing the many strategies of 
justification implemented by social actors. In the construction of social 
protection, this can be expressed by the strategies of the different groups of 
actors who constitute the political, economic, and domestic orders. The 
definition of what is just is not a matter of belief shared by all, but is based 
on a process of demonstration. It is necessary to demonstrate that this defi-
nition of “the just” is based on a higher common good that benefits every-
one. The legitimacy of the organization of social protection is then based on 
the justification of its value in terms of national solidarity. This demonstra-
tion is neither logical nor established once and for all. It is necessary to 
continually demonstrate the benefit for all. The definition of “justice” cho-
HSR 46 (2021) 1  │  42 
sen to serve the higher common good can be read as the grandeur of the 
great in the sense of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) but must appear to bene-
fit the smallest. It is the role of the politician to ensure that there is a place 
for the plurality of goods in deliberations. Otherwise a feeling of injustice 
may arise in society. 
During the Fordist period, the favorable political and economic context 
allowed each grandeur to express itself without encroaching on the others. 
National solidarity, which is intended to be egalitarian and distributive, can 
be interpreted as civic greatness (political order) and is not in contradiction 
with industrial greatness (economic order), which in turn controls the tools 
for measuring productive efficiency. The end of the Fordist period will 
change the rules of the game. The economic context is marked by the eco-
nomic crises of the 1970s and a process of transformation of public institu-
tions is underway. New conditions for measuring efficiency are introduced 
due to the predictions of slower economic growth. Representations of gran-
deur in the different orders come into conflict. During the Fordist period, 
the plurality of justifications of the spheres of social justice is accepted. This 
does not mean that the logics that run through the orders are harmonious, 
but that there is a place for all these logics. Since the end of the Fordist peri-
od, what has changed is not the loss of harmony between the orders, but the 
fact that the exogenous context of the institutions that govern the orders no 
longer allows each one of them to run free. Indeed, the different orders 
carry logics that are almost exclusive of each other. The forms of articula-
tion that are established do not make it possible to bring out a point of view 
that could be qualified as “common goods” in the sense that it would allow a 
junction between all orders. The legitimacy of the Fordist convention of 
national solidarity is then called into question and the sources of justifica-
tion will lead to the emergence of a new convention still in search of legiti-
macy: the liberal convention. 
2.2 Desocialization for Making the Patient Feel Responsible:  
The Liberal Convention of National Solidarity 
The 1970s economic crisis changed the game. The financial crisis not only 
turned into a crisis of economic efficiency in the areas of state social inter-
vention, it led to a crisis in the legitimacy of public social welfare institu-
tions. As a result, a new balance of power has been established between the 
social protection orders. Opposing normative registers across these differ-
ent orders. Different values justify a representation of the world that is no 
longer in harmony between the orders. Therefore, a new convention is 
being established in favor of the economic order. This convention can be 
described as liberal. According to Batifoulier, Da Silva, and Duchesne (2019), 
the liberal convention underpins individual sovereignty and denounces 
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scrounging as well as fraud and abuses. National solidarity cannot move 
beyond the horizon of individual responsibility and should therefore be 
residual and reserved to those who, because they are too poor or too ill, 
cannot exercise their own free will. 
As François Eymard-Duvernay (2016) shows, in a balance of power not all 
parties hold the same power. The dominant convention that is established is 
indicative of a capacity for justification and valuation that is superior to the 
others. The liberal agreement is established in a conflictual context. But the 
conflict does not prevent the agreement (Larquier and Batifoulier 2005) 
around the liberal convention. Those who exercise political power impose 
their representation of the social world and their representation of national 
solidarity. 
Since the 1980s, the dominant principle of justice has been more utilitari-
an and commutative. Inequalities became acceptable in logic of economic 
rationality. The precondition for making these inequalities acceptable is the 
equal opportunity and the freedom of individuals. The differences in situa-
tions that persist ex post (i.e., when equality of opportunity is observed and 
freedom is respected) can have three origins (Goujon 1997). Inequalities 
observed ex post may firstly refer to individual behavior (excessive risk-
taking or laziness). Secondly, inequalities can be linked to hazard (accidents 
of course). Thirdly, they may be natural (presence of disability or illness). 
These inequalities can be considered just from the point of view of commu-
tative justice. However, only the first one is considered socially acceptable 
in this new spirit of post-Fordist capitalism that supports the liberal conven-
tionalist view. That is why the state guarantees a social minimum in the 
form of health insurance and unemployment insurance in the other two 
cases. The present form of social protection is based on a new definition of 
national solidarity, the definition of liberal order of worth. 
This paradigm shift concerning the adopted principle of justice comes 
from the fact that risks no longer come from exogenous elements. Interna-
tional, political, and monetary stability allow for an expansion of social 
visibility. There is a tearing of the veil of ignorance in the Rawlsian vocabu-
lary. The different risks are no longer considered to be associated to citizen 
status and the risks relating to the different professional statuses are re-
duced due to the tertiarization. Everyone can know in advance their eco-
nomic situation and the risks involved. As a result, the preference is no 
longer for social protection but for individual protection. The universal 
social protection contract no longer seems legitimate. A new compromise 
between the political, economic, and domestic orders needs to be stabilized. 
In this new conventional vision, only the universal scope in favor of the 
most deprived, the chronically sick, and the handicapped is acceptable. 
From a holistic representation of society during the Fordist period, we move 
on to an individualistic dimension that reflects the new spirit of capitalism. 
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This will make it possible to understand the questioning of the logic of soli-
darity. This new representation explains the changes in the organization of 
social protection. Social protection is moving from a collective dimension to 
a corporatist dimension, which is developing through an increase in com-
plementary insurance. The choice of complementary health insurance is 
now based on a similarity in the profiles of the insureds (i.e., to be healthy) 
and to represent a small risk. As a result, society becomes trapped by indi-
vidualism and the universalist ideal becomes unattainable. In the Fordist 
convention, individual freedom corresponds to the freedom of the citizen, 
i.e., the integration of individual interests into collective interests. Since the 
beginning of the post-Fordist period, individual freedom has been formal 
freedom. Individual interest is an end-in-itself. This new paradigm elimi-
nates the collective assumption of risk: it is no longer justified. Individual 
behavior described as risky is going to be singled out. 
The structural crisis in the health care system since the 1980s is not the 
first. The questioning of the logic of collective solidarity is systematically 
justified by opportunistic behavior. The patient’s abusive behavior, taking 
advantage of the social insurance scheme for spending more than neces-
sary, was already exposed in the 1940s (Valat 2001; Pierru 2007). This repeti-
tive criticism crops up again in each deficit period. Fighting against health 
expenses getting out of control has then become a fight against the patient’s 
lack of responsibility. This theme is coming from the risk theory (Domin 
2006a), which has gradually extended to the discourse of the political order. 
If the arguments exposed in the 1940s and 1950s are similar to those put 
forward today, they now emphasize more strongly the market referential 
underpinning the healthcare policy. Stressing the role of expenses in the 
deficit, refusing to increase the compulsory contributions and hence the 
revenues, and decreasing public expenditure turned into a sacrosanct prin-
ciple bring the policy of demand back to the foreground. Out of social ne-
cessity, which before prohibited any extra health cost for the patient, the 
supply had to be controlled for mastering the expenses. Today, this argu-
ment is relegated to the background. 
The state then determines the frameworks and the values enabling this 
market representation to operate. The light shed on insured people’s oppor-
tunist behaviors inevitably leads to criticizing socialized health insurance. 
The patient’s bad reputation is indeed closely related to the socialization of 
health insurance. The patient develops a freeloader’s behavior since he 
takes advantage of the socialization of the insurance system. The gratuity, or 
the feeling of gratuity, supposedly leads to immoderate expenses. It would 
trigger in each individual a supposedly natural lazying-around inclination 
and then wasting the monies of the community. In this institutional context, 
every insured person may develop a perverse attitude in complete impunity 
since he knows that his unjustified expenses will be supported by collective 
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financing. If every individual behaves like a profiteer, it is because the so-
cial, compulsory, and collective form of health insurance provides him with 
golden opportunities. It then goes without saying that the excess of social 
insurance is the cause for wasted or unjustified consumption. 
Revealing the patients’ abuse thus masks any criticism of the social insur-
ance system. This formatting of the problem brings its own range of solu-
tions. If the problem is the socialization of the health insurance system, the 
answer must be sought in desocialization. It is along these lines that the 
patient’s financial contribution has been called upon, especially by the co-
payment policy and activation of the complementary relief space. 
This political construction feeds on the breakthroughs of economic theory 
when it characterizes the healthcare market as durably marked by asym-
metrical information generated by strategic behaviors (Arrow 1963). The 
relations between economic agents were characterized by uneven distribu-
tion of information. This so-called “agency relationship” is marked by dis-
tortion when allocating resources qualifies as moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Thus, the relations between the health insurance scheme and the 
patients would be characterized by an agency relationship with moral haz-
ard and adverse selection which diminishes the global welfare in any given 
economy (Pauly 1968). 
The patient’s abuse is directly associated with the notion of moral hazard 
which has been largely addressed in the theoretical as well as the empirical 
literature and provides a theoretical underpinning to a normative intuition. 
The patient’s abuse is a consequence of his strategic rationality. Wasting has 
become a rational attitude and the patient’s abuse is only a by-product of the 
economic rationality assumption considered as universal. The abusive be-
haviors are fueled by the collective character of the health insurance sys-
tem, which enables every patient to behave like a free rider. This immoral 
patient could not care less about the common good: he takes advantage of 
the collective insurance system without financially bearing the consequenc-
es of his irresponsible behavior. Seeking to obtain all the credit, he behaves 
like a freeloader. The very collective character of the health insurance sys-
tem enables him to develop such behavior: the patient may use this public 
service without having to bear the costs thereof. 
When every patient behaves like a free rider, it is the whole health insur-
ance system which is vulnerable. The development of the co-payment sys-
tem with its associated harsher legislation then becomes a means for pro-
moting more virtuous behavior in a supposed “homo oeconomicus” patient. 
The economic theory and its capacity to perform the healthcare policy 
have put in evidence the dangerousness of a complete social insurance 
system. If total gratuity is a perverse incentive, resorting to co-payment 
becomes the right incentive, the one to raise rational individuals’ awareness 
to adopt thrifty behaviors. Only if patients have fully grasped their interest 
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can the healthcare policy curb strategic behaviors. Paradoxically, resorting 
to lucrative interest thus helps fight against the effects of searching for lu-
crative interest. The metamorphosis of complementary health insurance is 
a core element of this representation of the patient (Batifoulier 2013). 
The policy implemented since the beginning of the 2000s has accelerated 
the transformation of a social insured patient into a consumer managing his 
own health capital. The law of March 4, 2002 of sick people’s rights and the 
quality of the healthcare system is the first transformation step. With a view 
to stressing the patient’s role in his interaction with the doctor, the law urges 
the practitioner to provide all the possible information to the patient and 
promotes searching for his enlightened consent. This evolution can be 
grasped as an attempt to popularize the therapeutic relation and to consider 
it more widely speaking in the context of a market regulation where the 
patient is superseded by a healthcare consumer (Domin 2006b). Indeed, as 
the increase in health expenses is generally associated with the allegedly 
irresponsible behavior of the actors, the purpose of the economic health 
policy is to set up devices for limiting opportunistic behaviors. These 
measures rest upon the incentives theory whose aim is, via a sanc-
tion/rewards system, to suspend the nuisance capacities of the actors when 
lacking information. 
Incentives are hence considered as a collection of events, manipulated by 
the decision-maker so as to modify the agents’ actions. The domain of health 
still comes under the umbrella of this new function of the welfare state 
considered as a manipulator of incentives (Batifoulier, Eymard-Duvernay, 
and Favereau 2007). Indeed, there is no such thing as a dysfunction that 
could not be fixed by a good incentive. The co-payment mechanisms, the 
growing portion left to complementary health insurance, and the level of 
the patient’s out-of-pocket payments should then only [be] gauged by their 
capacity to entice insured people to adopt thrifty behaviors in terms of 
health expenses. 
The Act of August 13, 2004 hence associates compulsory healthcare insur-
ance and complementary healthcare insurance. The reduction in expenses 
hence involves a collaboration of both forms of insurance. The contracts 
binding the socially insured people with the complementary health insur-
ance (qualified as responsible contracts) delineate the role of the compulso-
ry and complementary insurances and must include, in order to benefit 
from tax and social exonerations, provisions in keeping with the treatment 
pathway. This scheme gives a new role to complementary health insurance 
which must hence apply the same policy as the compulsory healthcare in-
surance (Ginon 2005). The aim is to harmonize every party’s role. The re-
sponsible contracts offered by complementary health insurance partakes of 
the health expenses control policy inasmuch as refund restrictions and 
exclusions contribute to fight against moral hazard and must encourage 
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insured people to behave more responsibly in terms of healthcare (Del Sol 
and Turquet 2005). Transferring a growing number of insured towards such 
organizations will induce them to control deviant behaviors by amplifying 
non-refunds and accentuating the patient’s out-of-pocket payment. This 
new governance – involving apportionment between compulsory and com-
plementary healthcare insurances – implies the socially insured person 
must bear the financial consequences of his behavior. 
The evolution of the patient’s representation as a potential trickster justi-
fies the awareness measures and the transfer of a portion of expenses to-
wards complementary health insurance, henceforth directly associated with 
that policy and now bound to go in the same direction as the public 
schemes: no refund if the social security does not refund. Analyzing the 
metamorphosis of complementary health insurance then enables gauging 
the eroding logic of solidarity in France. The logic regarding the bearing of 
the costs has been transformed in-depth and will result in worsened ine-
qualities. 
3. Erratic Healthcare Economic Policy and Worsened 
Inequalities 
The theory of moral hazard and the policies deriving therefrom are based 
on a normative presupposition highlighting the patient’s rational abuse. 
This normative assumption personified in the new role devolved to com-
plementary protection is the source of collateral damages: the carry-over 
policies on the complementary insurance system especially penalize the 
poorest and the sickest individuals (Domin and Rauly 2019). Their expected 
efficiency (in controlling health expenses) translates to a substantial in-
crease in inequalities (section 3.1). 
These policies should be corrected by getting certain patients outside the 
common scheme. This neo-conservative inspired targeting strategy is costly. 
It is then paradoxical if detrimental to the objective sought: to decrease 
healthcare insurance expenses (section 3.2). It also finds it hard to fight 
against care access inequalities since it is still marked by a political and 
moral philosophy dominated by social liberalism, thereby exacerbating 
threshold and stigmatization problems characterizing targeting policies 
(section 3.3). 
3.1 The Implementation of a Socially Unequal System: A French 
Particularity 
Since the law of June 13, 2013 (effective from January 1, 2016), employers 
have been obliged to provide complementary health insurance to employ-
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ees. The minimum benefits are defined by law (co-payment coverage, daily 
hospital flat rate without time limit) and optical and dental coverage are 
slightly higher than those of complementary contracts defined in 2015. 
Employers are obliged to pay half of the contribution. Except for specific 
cases provided in the law, employees are obliged to take out the comple-
mentary insurance offered by their employer. The 2013 law completes a 
series of measures taken since the early 2000s to promote access to com-
plementary health insurance for employees through their employer. 
In 2014, before the generalization of complementary health insurance, 
95% of the population benefited from it, including 7% thanks to the Com-
plementary Universal Healthcare Coverage (CMUC) scheme. The lack of 
complementary health insurance is strongly linked to financial resources: 
12% of the first quintile are not covered, 5% for the second, and 3% for the 
third. Half of the people not covered have an income of less than 970 euros 
(per consumption unit) and three quarters of people have an income of less 
than 1,400 euros. Sixteen percent of the unemployed are also not covered by 
complementary health insurance. Age is also an important factor: the rate 
of people without complementary coverage is higher for young adults. The 
first reason for not covering remains financial: more than half of the people 
not covered are not covered because of the high cost (Perronnin and Louvel 
2018). 
The policy of generalizing complementary health insurance seems to have 
borne fruit, since in 2017, 84% of companies employing 96% of employees 
benefited from it compared to 75% before generalization. By way of com-
parison, in 2009, 44% of companies offered complementary coverage to 72% 
of employees. Four out of ten companies now offer their employees com-
plementary health insurance, whereas they did not offer it before the law 
was passed. Some companies (21% of all establishments) have reviewed 
their offer in its entirety (level of guarantees, etc.) for at least one category 
of employees. The change is even more important for very small institu-
tions, which are twice as likely to offer a complementary scheme (Lapinte 
and Perronnin 2018). 
The generalization of the system depends essentially on the size and sector 
of the company. The size of the company is a first explanatory factor: 24% of 
establishments with less than five employees do not yet have a complemen-
tary health insurance system, compared with 4.5% for companies with five 
to nine employees and less than 2% for companies with ten or more em-
ployees. The sector of activity is another factor explaining the lack of health 
coverage. The sectors with the lowest coverage are service activities, public 
administration, and agriculture. On the other hand, the industrial, financial 
and insurance sectors are the ones that best cover their employees. There 
are still gaps related to the professional situation. The rate of employees 
working in an establishment that does not offer complementary insurance 
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is 1.5% for executives. On the other hand, it is slightly above 5% among 
administrative and commercial employees. 
For companies that provide their employees with complementary health 
insurance, two solutions are possible: a single contract for all employees or 
a distinction between objective categories of employees (managers or non-
managers, level of remuneration, professional classifications, etc.). A ma-
jority of companies (89% employing 79% of employees) have opted for a 
single coverage, while 11% of companies offer two separate offers. The 
share of companies making a single offer decreases with increasing size: for 
companies with less than 5 employees, 94% offer a single contract, for those 
with 500 employees, the share is now only 84%. The larger a structure is, the 
easier it is to set up a contract for each category of employee. 
The law of June 13, 2013 regulates the reimbursements offered by the con-
tracts. When the share covered by social security is zero or low (private 
room in the hospital, pairs of glasses, dental prosthesis), the reimbursement 
gaps are significant. As a result, repayment levels are quite variable. Nearly 
30% of contracts reimburse specialist doctor visits only at a minimum. 
Twenty-three percent of employees are in this case. In contrast, 36% of 
contracts (41% of employees) reimburse the maximum allowed (200% of the 
conventional rate). Let us take another typical example, pairs of complex 
eyeglasses. The law imposes a minimum guarantee of 200 euros plus social 
security reimbursement. Eleven percent of contracts (9% of employees) are 
in line with this guarantee. The average and median reimbursement levels 
are respectively 549 and 561 euros per employee. Finally, the last decile of 
employees benefits from a reimbursement level greater than or equal to 850 
euros. The reimbursement of dental prostheses is another example of ine-
qualities in this area. At a cost of 1,200 euros, the average reimbursement is 
352 euros per contract and 368 euros per employee. The ratio between the 
first and last decile is four (Perronnin 2019). 
The study of the guarantees offered by the contracts shows that their level 
increases with the size of the company. However, this observation is more 
complex insofar as it depends on the guarantees. For example, reimburse-
ment of hospital doctors’ fees, dental prostheses, and hearing aids is better 
for companies with 50 to 99 employees than for companies with 10 to 49 
employees. However, the levels of reimbursement of hospital practitioners’ 
fees and the provision of private rooms are higher for companies with 250 to 
499 employees than for companies with 500 employees. The level of cover-
age is positively related to the level of salary. Complementary health insur-
ance must therefore be analyzed as a salary supplement. In other words, the 
level of coverage is positively related to the level of compensation. For all 
coverages, managers have access to high levels of reimbursement while 
commercial employees and unskilled workers have access to low quality 
complementary schemes. 
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3.2 New Expenses Induced by Patients’ Segmentation 
The voluntary introduction of financial barriers to healthcare (by co-
payment schemes or fee overrun) leads to patients reducing their consump-
tion of medications, let alone giving it up altogether, which may prove det-
rimental to health. The dilemma between efficiency (in expenses reduction) 
and fairness (in access to care) of the health policies has taken a harsher 
turn. When the policies fighting against moral hazard are efficient, they lead 
to fairness issues. This obvious state of fact, henceforth largely documented, 
upsets the conception of the cheating patient. Thus, work puts forward the 
positive externalities of healthcare coverage for society and puts the idea of 
insurance also securing access to healthcare back on the agenda. 
If the reason for access is emphasized, and not only aversion of risk, then 
the insurance scheme has a positive effect on social welfare since it enables 
individuals to benefit from a treatment which they could not finance on 
their own in view of their income (Nyman 1999). . The complete insurance 
policy has hence an intrinsic value when it enables access to healthcare, 
which is impossible without insurance. Such is the case more particularly 
for patients whose insufficient income does not enable them to consult a 
doctor without digging into their pockets, regardless of the treatment. It is 
also the case for patients whose severe disease is too costly without insur-
ance, regardless of their income. 
Under these conditions, poverty or long-term disease negate suspected 
free rider’s behaviors. For these types of patient, an anti-moral hazard phe-
nomenon may describe a situation where a failure of insurance causes un-
der-consumption of healthcare, which proves health detrimental and 
weighs on collective welfare. The suspicion of a pointless expense, when it 
exists, may only affect other kinds of patients, on whom co-payments 
should be re-directed. Exposing the issue whereby the effort requested from 
the patient above a given threshold is counter-productive, the healthcare 
policy has taken on board the fact that a freeloader’s behavior is not a uni-
versal behavior. This observation restricts the space of potential abuse. It 
requires identifying the patients or the types of care, which should not be 
encompassed by co-insurance policies. The result in France is the segmen-
tation of patients. 
The development of cost sharing policies with patients thus combines with 
measures to protect certain socially insured people against the perverse 
effects of such policies. In France, the conception of the categories of peo-
ple to be privileged has recently been revamped: the poorest with the CMUC 
are now treated as the sickest patients (long-term diseases) and the dis-
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bursements are 100% supported by social security.5 One of the most im-
portant aspects of the health insurance reform thus consists in organizing 
the segmentation of patients according to their contribution to the financing 
of their health expenses. Certain patients are more heavily called upon 
whereas others are dispensed thereof by the public policy. This targeted 
solidarity is significant, if only for the financial means laid down for a full 
refund of the medical expenses for the 12 million people concerned. In a 
context where the aim is to reduce expenses, one of the essential aspects of 
the health insurance reform is to intensify the co-payment policies while 
increasing the number of exonerated people to avoid the collateral damages 
induced by an institutionalized notion of moral hazard. This double move-
ment draws a risk-sharing line between private relief by complementary 
protection and collective solidarity. 
The importance of this targeting in the health sector reflects in the num-
ber of people concerned, the volume of laid down healthcare insurance 
expenses, and by the growth differential (the expenses associated with co-
payment exonerating increase faster than those combined with co-
payment). It also explains why health insurance desocialization can be seen 
everywhere except in statistics: if private or privatized health expense 
grows, socialized expense is not obligatorily on the decrease.6 However, 
desocialization is a fact for the particular patient whose costs are not 100% 
supported. The extended use of co-payment exonerating is an unexpected 
backlash of its intensification. The new expenses, which should thereby be 
met, are merely the consequence of the search for savings initiated by this 
demand policy: any additional pay-for condition inevitably involves a new 
free opportunity. The transfer of expenses to private relief strengthens 
public bearing of the costs. This feedback movement evinces the ethical 
requirement characterizing health expenses. The healthcare economic 
policy rests on ethical judgments regarding the correct or acceptable func-
tioning of the health system. CMUC-type corrections made to demand poli-
cies are associated with a fair operation of the health system. Because jus-
tice (or injustice), “value,” or ethical issues are acutely expressed when 
touching upon healthcare distribution, health demand policies should not 
 
5  The CMUC scheme enables people residing in France to benefit from free supplementary 
health insurance in certain income conditions; in 2018, 5.6 million people benefited therefrom. 
A list of 30 pathologies exempt from co-payment is also drawn up; in 2018, 10.7 million people 
benefited therefrom. 
6  From 1990 to 2018, the financing of health expenditure underwent a major change. The share 
of social security decreased from 77.4% in 1990 to 76.3% in 2010. Since 2010, it has increased 
to 78.1% in 2018. This evolution can be explained by the establishment of restrictive 
measures: a flat fee contribution in 2005, increased co-payments in 2006 and 2007 and intro-
duction of franchises in 2008. Private expenditure (complementary health insurance and out-
of-pocket payments) has experienced the opposite trend. It rose from 21.5% to 22.5% be-
tween 1990 and 2010. Since then, it has decreased to 20.4% (Soual 2017; Gonzalez et al. 2019). 
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raise financial barriers to access to care. The organization of the health 
system is revelatory of the social pact cementing a society. When, in the 
name of public budget reduction, the implemented schemes may lead pa-
tients to give up on healthcare, they undermine the social contract of which 
the health system is depository. Unless the political system is changed and 
the social contract revamped, this ethical obligation requires new expenses. 
Seeking to achieve efficient co-payment policies in this context (in terms of 
expense reduction) is illusory. It then remains to query the capability of this 
segmentation to fight against care access inequalities. 
3.3 Compromised Equity 
This segmentation, while stressing targeted solidarity, reveals a neo-
conservative drift (in the sense of social protection theories) of the health 
insurance in France. Individuals are eligible upon completion of an admin-
istrative procedure (examination of their resources or of the deterioration of 
their health condition) which supersedes an automatic and truly universal 
service (Castel 2008; Merrien, Parchet, and Kernen 2005; Batifoulier 2008). 
The selective services granted by an interventionist social state, to fight 
against poverty, are also one of the characteristics of a liberal social protec-
tion system. 
This double-sided policy promoted by the social state is the product of the 
patient’s representation inspired from the market referential. It may correct 
a few aspects, but the overall nature remains unchanged. The norm is still 
indeed the co-payment, whereas exemption should be exceptional. The path 
followed by the reform rests on a social liberalism with the emphasis on 
individual choice and freedom. Targeting and public protection must be 
restricted to the spaces where individual responsibility cannot be expressed. 
Only individuals arguably know what is good for them. The need for protec-
tion can then only be subjective and based on how the individuals value 
their own health, which may be reflected in their assent to pay. 
Under these conditions, the ordinary normative underpinning of health 
demand policy remains that of the rational patient, who must accept re-
sponsibility for his own choices. The liberal trend of the health insurance in 
France is then in keeping with the social liberalism which characterizes the 
patient’s representation and which encourages individuals to turn to the 
market of complementary health insurance. Such evolution generates per-
verse effects when inequalities, that some endeavor to reduce, are in fact 
increasing (Nay et al. 2016). 
The threshold effects are symptomatic of the targeting policies. They are 
expressed more vividly in a context where insured people are segmented 
and the rational patient is set as an example inasmuch as patients on the 
fringe are victim to intensifying policies fighting against moral hazard. 
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Thus, the definition of poverty using the CMUC threshold is partial and 
biased. It ignores individuals whose financial resources are on the same 
level as certain social minima and below the monetary poverty threshold, 
who must cover increasing healthcare costs whereas their health condition 
does not fundamentally differ from the CMUC recipients’. Corrections are 
not only insufficient7 but do not eliminate the threshold effects, which seem 
to be endless. They are symptomatic of the contradiction between efficiency 
and fairness, inherent to the targeting device: a low resource threshold does 
restrict the population affected by the scheme and makes the families with 
resources above the threshold vulnerable. A higher level of resources is 
more equitable but more expensive. The savings made are low when the 
measure is limited to high income earners. 
Measuring the severity of the disease is also subjected to a threshold effect 
since this category, just like that of poverty, is the product of a social con-
struction. Consequently, chronically ill patients sometimes have to face 
significant out-of-pocket payments since they still must settle the co-
payment for other health expenses (unless covered by the CMUC).8 Classifi-
cation into serious diseases (recognized as such by social security), subject-
ed to the doctor’s judgment, involves some interpretation margin for certain 
pathologies. Certain patients with repeated or long-lasting pathologies or 
requiring hospitalization for under 30-days9 must not surprisingly bear a 
significant financial burden (Bras, Grass, and Obrecht 2007). Calling more 
heavily on the patient’s contribution is contrary to the principle of solidarity 
if disease admittedly chooses its victims at random. If disease elects con-
tributors, solidarity becomes blind whereas it should be directed (from the 
rich to the poor or from the healthy to the sick people). 
In terms of income as of disease severity, the protection against the out-of-
pocket payments is quite imperfect since it is impossible to find a threshold 
above which a patient is declared responsible. As the segments are not abso-
lutely tight, the targeting process leads to insured people being placed into 
into a responsible situation, with which they cannot cope. It introduces 
health precariousness. By throwing social discredit and suspicion on the 
concerned populations and by generating negative externalities, stigmatiza-
 
7  The state’s assistance with the acquisition of a complementary health insurance, renamed 
“health voucher,” if the income is smaller than the CMU threshold, first +15% then +20% (€100 
for under 25-year olds, €200 from 25 to 59-year olds and €400 above), does not solve this re-
curring problem as it does not allow beneficiaries to acquire a “low range” complementary 
health insurance and creates new thresholds. 
8  The report on serious diseases (recognized as such by social security) prepared by the Haut 
Conseil pour l’Avenir de l’Assurance Maladie (High Council for the Future of Health Insurance) 
emphasizes that out-of-pocket payments are close to twice as high as in the general popula-
tion. It averages €596, among which €254 is a co-payment for customary care and €195 for a 
fee overrun. 
9  Beyond that, the co-payment is covered. 
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tion is another feature often mentioned of targeting policies. Clearer separa-
tion between the populations benefiting from health insurance and those 
living off state benefits renders said stigmatizations even worse. The seg-
mentation of patients leads to viewing solidarity as a minimalist action. 
Under these conditions, public policy results in negative stereotypes being 
increasingly taken for granted. Such stigma worsens in a fighting atmos-
phere against moral hazard where the responsible patient is singled out 
(Stuber and Schlesinger 2006). The perception of the need for care is conse-
quently modified, with lesser consumption thereof as a side effect. 
The administrative constraints are particularly tangible for the targeted 
audiences. Patients with long-lasting disease are compelled to follow a care 
protocol. Just like the CMUC recipients, they must comply with the treat-
ment pathway, the failing of which would lead to them no longer being 
exonerated from the co-payment scheme. The other patients are not gov-
erned by such constraints. More particularly, they are not obliged to con-
form to the treatment pathway if they are willing to accept the maluses. The 
incitative rules are thus the privilege of the average patients whereas the 
rules are only coercive for the most fragile patients. 
Harsher constraint for some and a mere incitative context for the others is 
a source of stigmatization. This different degree of obedience to the rule 
may lead, in some cases, to waive the right to exoneration from co-payment. 
Pointing out the poorest, combined with the hostility of some doctors, can 
be one of the causes why an increasing number of people give up on the 
CMUC insurance scheme. The fairness objective defended by the public 
policy then paradoxically translates in lesser effective access to care. If the 
evolution of the public targeting policy shows that the patient’s socio-
economic criteria cannot be overlooked any longer when allocating health 
insurance coverage, nothing guarantees a priori that doctors share the same 
view about the patients who ought to be prioritized. This faulty representa-
tion renders the public policy vulnerable, when it seeks to solve healthcare 
access issues.10 
The new architecture of the health system suffers from a deficit in legiti-
macy. Phenomena such as stigmatization, non-recourse, or refusal of care, 
demonstrate how the rules’ effectiveness is sensitive to their legitimacy 
(Bessis 2008). When a system of rules is seen as legitimate by the actors, the 
latter have a tendency to act according to the idea they have of an adequate 
operation of the health system. Conversely, when the rules are not deemed 
legitimate, the actors seek to circumvent the rules that then lose their effec-
tivity. 
 
10  See Batifoulier, Da Silva, and Domin (2018) for an overview. 
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4. Conclusion 
The legitimacy crisis of the French healthcare system has led to the intro-
duction of a market referential. It involves reducing socialized expenses, the 
ones whose costs are borne by social health insurance. An a priori – very 
simple to achieve – is to transfer expenses to the patient who will then re-
finance it with his complementary organization. The expense is then a pri-
vate expense and does not weigh (or hardly weighs) on public accounts. This 
burden transfer to the patient or his complementary health insurance re-
duces public compulsory deductions but substantially increases the contri-
bution asked from the patient for financing his health expenses. By linking 
the patient’s level of coverage to his income, it substantially increases ine-
qualities. It then mechanically leads patients to give up on healthcare for 
financial reasons, which will in fine deteriorate the health condition of the 
population at large. 
To reduce socialized health-related expense may hence not be a gross ob-
jective of the economic policy. Transferring costs to the patients or his com-
plementary health insurance cannot be made in the dark. It must be moder-
ate and modulated. Tightening the budget constraint should also take on 
board the damages that the realization of this objective may cause. The 
healthcare policy thus must face a dilemma: to reduce expenses without 
detriment to fighting against inequalities in access to care. This dilemma is a 
consequence of the dominance of the liberal convention. 
This dilemma has been taken concretely into consideration with the will to 
hunt any supposedly pointless or unjustified consumption while seeking to 
improve access to care, for a sustainable cost both for individuals and the 
collectivity. The social protection system founded and governed by citizens 
and the social partners is sliding towards a market of individual protection 
orchestrated by complementary health insurance organizations. This is a 
denial of the fact that social insurance, through national solidarity, creates 
cohesion between individuals, which is the foundation of society. Social 
protection, in contrast to corporatist protection, gives substance to the soci-
ety and limits the risks associated to the dislocation of the social link. The 
evolution of society towards more individualized principles of protection 
does not necessarily entail less expenditure, but a change in the legitimacy 
of the tax. In the Fordist compromise, the funds levied were used for na-
tional solidarity and the equality of social protection. Tomorrow they will be 
used for national unity and the reduction of the social divide. Considering 
this transfer of costs, the transition from an egalitarian system of social 
protection to a private system may not represent a cost effectiveness ratio 
that is advantageous for the community. 
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